From Encounter to Dialogue

The frequent crisis of negotiations in case of conflicts is an open problem for philosophy. In particular, what ingredient(s) lacks for the effective result of mediations devoted to peace keeping or to restore an acceptable status quo? I suggest to reconceptualize the idea of dialogue, focusing on the encounter phase. I get back to my previous studies, in order to offer the readers of Rekh Magazine some ideas for reflection. This is part 1

A discussion (Wix Pics)

By Primavera Fisogni

PhD in Metaphysics

This paper explores the relationship between encounter and dialogue. Starting from the widespread appeal for dialogue that resonates across the globalized world as a means to solve political, religious, and social conflicts, I argue that the encounter—a face-to-face relationship that opens the way to communication—is the preliminary condition for all dialectical confrontation. This intuition leads to the further premise that no proper dialogue can occur without first having an encounter. The encounter, as a qualified relationship between two subjects of responsibility—rather than a mere I/Thou relation as Buber argued in his masterpiece Ich und Du—is to be considered the site of agreement and interpersonal commitment based on mutual responsibility. These speculative figures of practical philosophy play a major role in the construction of dialogue: they originate its peculiar dialectical conflict while also resolving it into a veritable result. The encounter, far from being a simple “meeting,” plays a strategic role in building dialogue because it gives rise to the ethical commitment of the dialectical event. These reflections lead us to: 1) revaluate the appeal for dialogue beyond its aporias, and 2) strive to create the conditions for a new culture of encounter (across social, religious, interpersonal, and cultural spheres).

I. The appeal for dialogue: The difficulty of translating it into a concrete act

Dialogue seems to be “the only way” to solve political and social problems, especially during moments of crisis and conflict, such as those we are currently experiencing. A number of phenomena, such as global terrorism, multicultural conflicts, and the uprising of new social actors who reject state power, all cast new light on the central role played by dialogical relationships in building peaceful coexistence. At the same time, it is evident that this global effort toward mutual understanding clashes with the difficulty of translating the appeal into a concrete act. I consider this the most complex issue in the study of dialogue. While sociologists would have much to say about this, philosophers usually ignore this aporia. I would like to encourage readers to consider how the encounter is essential to making a dialogue—perhaps even more essential, from a phenomenological perspective, than the discourse itself.

I.1 The appeal for dialogue as a calling to an encounter

In the first part of the paper, I will show that discourse is not the primary goal of every appeal for dialogue. What an invocation properly seeks is an encounter; that is to say, it identifies and calls upon somebody to assume the responsibility of an interpersonal act (namely, the act of engaging in dialogue to discuss a specific topic). Building on this phenomenological intuition, I will argue that an encounter is the precondition of dialogue itself. If these premises are strong enough to be accepted, it follows that a proper dialogue cannot exist without an encounter. The first step of the argumentation examines the sense of the appeal for dialogue, which may be formally summarized by the utterance “let’s dialogue!”

Does this proposition make sense? This is not a rhetorical question, as it could seem at first glance. The verb “to dialogue,” in fact, belongs to the group of so-called performatives, and the utterance deals with the domain of speech acts. The sense of the expression “let’s dialogue!”, then, depends on the possibility of translating it into an act. What I underline is that the utterance has a pragmatic meaning, not only a semantic one. From this point of view, I conclude that it makes sense only if the dialogue truly takes place. In other words, the appeal for dialogue seems to suffer from a double internal weakness linked to its illocutionary force:

• As an invitation, “let’s dialogue!” is basically a desire;

• As a performative verb, “to dialogue” requires performance.

We have reached a first conclusion about the very essence of an appeal: the locutionary act (saying “let’s dialogue!”) doesn’t work without the corresponding illocutionary act (the act of having a dialogue).

Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to say that the statement “let’s dialogue!” lacks pragmatic efficacy altogether. The invitation plays a central role in calling the partners of a potential dialogue to a specific responsibility. First, it identifies the subjects of the dialectical relationship: the appeal may not achieve its effect, but it clearly indicates that leader A and leader B could solve the conflict for which they have been called upon. In other terms, the invitation: 1) brings the actors of the dialogue to the stage, presentifying them, and 2) by highlighting their responsibility (to answer the appeal by performing an act), identifies them as moral subjects.

In a very broad sense, the appeal to dialogue gives rise to the transcendental conditions of an encounter. Not only because it brings to the surface the subjects of the future dialectical exchange, but also because it calls them to a mutual confrontation: before engaging in discourse together, these subjects are called to be together to understand one another. Moving further, I would say that the subjects invoked by an appeal are already face-to-face within the utterance itself (“let’s dialogue!”), although in a virtual way.

2. Encounter: A preliminary condition of dialogue

I have assumed that an encounter is the preliminary condition of dialogue itself. This intuition, to be accepted, must be carefully examined. In order to prove it, I must clarify the mutual relation affecting both terms: encounter and dialogue. I will do this in two stages: first, I will highlight the main traits of an encounter as a mediated relationship and the role of the encounter in Plato’s Dialogues, the text where the notion of dialogue was originally given to Western culture. Then, I will show the structural similarities between encounter and dialogue from an ontological perspective (as they both share a paradoxical/antinomic nature).

2.1 Encounter: A mediated relationship that preludes dialogue

I shall move on to some reflections about the very essence of encounter to ensure each step treads on secure ground. What phenomenological investigation points out is that an encounter cannot be confused with an I/Thou relation, as Martin Buber argues in his masterpiece Ich und Du—a view he partly reconsiders thirty years later. This interpersonal phenomenon is not as immediate as the German thinker affirms; an encounter is something more complex in both the interpersonal and ethical domains. An encounter is properly marked by intentionality and reciprocity—by the decision to look at the other person as a term of a relationship. As a consequence, a proper encounter opens up communication and prevents the possibility of conflict. The I/Thou relation can be seen as the first step of a potential encounter, as well as a potential “going against the Other.”

What is originally given in the I/Thou relation, as well as in an encounter, is the native tension from I to Thou and, on a more general ground, from I to It (that is, to the world). In this original movement, the possibility of conflict and agreement is given simultaneously. In Buber’s perspective, on the contrary, the I/Thou relation always preludes to a dialogical situation—to the understanding and respect of the Other. If we carefully analyze everyday experience, we realize that agreement is given only in the situation of the encounter, when two persons are face-to-face in a communicative attitude and share a common will for mutual understanding. This mediated tension—which calls for the will and mutual commitment of answering and questioning—emerges from the phenomenon of the encounter as a peculiar trait. It is precisely this interpersonal tension that allows a communicative exchange between the two terms of the relationship and can be seen as the preliminary condition of dialogue itself.

• In other words, we criticize Buber's main idea that dialogue simply moves from the immediate, native tension of a simple I to a simple Thou.

• In an encounter, the I is a qualified person who does not look at a generic other, but who refers to a qualified Thou.

• In the encounter, the native tension becomes an intention toward the other person. That is why conflict cannot exist inside a proper encounter.

(Part 1, to be continued).

References

Fisogni, P. (2006). Incontro al dialogo. La sfida dell'intesa nei tempi della crisi, Milano: Franco Angeli

Fisogni, P. (2015). The Good of Life. Essays in Metaphysics, London: Authorhouse