Pre-Moral Aspects of Evildoing

This paper addresses a crucial, often overlooked area of moral philosophy, philosophical anthropology, psychology, psychiatry, and metaphysics: the pre-moral aspects of wrongdoing. 'Pre-moral' conditions are not inherently malevolent but influence a moral act, strengthening the inclination toward wrongful behavior. In our era, characterized by escalating phenomena like terrorism, cyberterrorism, and violence against civilians, understanding these aspects is vital.

The Dark Internet (Wix Pic)

By Primavera Fisogni, philosopher and journalist, PhD

Abstract

This paper aims to highlight a previously overlooked area of moral philosophy that is also relevant to philosophical anthropology, psychology, psychiatry and metaphysics. The issue to be discussed concerns some pre-moral aspects of wrongdoing. 'Pre-moral' refers to the conditions that enter into a moral act, inclining it towards a final goal. Therefore, it can be concluded that these characteristics are not inherently malevolent; however, they can strengthen an individual's inclination towards wrongful behaviour. The present era is characterised by an increasing significance of harmful phenomena, including terrorism, cyberterrorism, armed conflicts involving escalating violence against civilians and cybercrimes. Globalisation, characterised by increasing interconnectedness between humans and digital machines within the onlife environment, has been proven to facilitate the dissemination of malevolence and its pre-moral aspects. This investigation will first explore the philosophical notion of evil before considering the lack of sensation as a prerequisite for a weakened sense of self and its connection to an inability to act morally. It will also examine how the internet can be considered a moral enabler that accelerates decision-making processes by bypassing certain phases of the will.

Keywords: evil, evildoing, moral, morality, pre-moral, terrorism, cyber-terrorism, sensing, moral enabler

Moral and morality

Premise

The initial phase of the investigation requires the elucidation of two words that have historically served as instruments in the domains of philosophy and theology: 'moral' and 'morality'. The common root of both terms can be traced back to the Latin word "mos", which is commonly translated as "costumes" or "habits", so that both terms are understood to pertain to the domain of human conduct. Indeed, moral principles and the concept of morality are inextricably linked to the realm of human agency (Villiers, 2023; McIntyre, 1984; Malik, 2014). The former pertains to the quality of action, while the latter is an inherent aspect of one's existence.

The moral standing of an action is determined not by an inherent, individual, or supernatural attribute, but rather by its alignment with a constellation of norms (also referring to a religious faith), laws, and paradigms that describe what is considered virtuous within a particular human milieu. Moral philosophy, in particular, is the branch of theoretical thinking concerned with determining which actions are or are not suitable to a group of established norms or principles.

It is important to briefly clarify the main traits of the norms in question.

From a general perspective, it can be distinguished between two categories of (moral) laws: firstly, natural law, which is made by universal principles that can be grasped by the human understanding; and secondly, social laws, which have been forged by humans through their civilization.

A substantial discourse pertains to the notion of natural law (Viola, 2021; Gregg, 2021), encompassing the question of its existence and the highly debated notion of ‘nature’. From an anthropological standpoint, however, certain fundamental principles can be identified as primary or originary, which, from a phenomenological perspective, are not further reducible. For instance, the provision of sustenance constitutes a fundamental condition for human subjects who are incapable of self-sustainment during their early infancy and beyond. It is an irrefutable fact that human subjects must establish and maintain interpersonal relationships in order to achieve both individual and social objectives.

The provision of sustenance for children and the assistance of an infant are two activities that are of particular significance. These actions are regarded as ethical, virtuous and fair. Conversely, the act of leaving a child unattended, or failing to provide them with fundamental care, is widely regarded as reprehensible and unjust. Consequently, any discourse about morality invariably delineates two opposing concepts: good/bad and right/fair/unfair. It is evident that, in addition to the aforementioned behaviours, a duty (or its non-observance) arises in relation to the provision of sustenance to a child. This suggests a strict correlation between morality and obligation; alternatively, a more precise formulation would be that morality is contingent on a series of fundamental obligations, which can be outlined as such: Firstly, the norm obliges the individual to act in a manner that is in accordance with it. Secondly, the subject is obliged by moral rules (Kant, 2005). Thirdly, the result of morality can be recognized in the capacity to orient one's life according to moral laws. Morality, or the absence thereof, exerts a significant influence on human conduct, which falls within the purview of ethics.

It has been established that the moral domain, which refers to a set of principles that guide individual conduct, emphasizes the role of the human subject. Morality, in essence, cannot be regarded as a matter of prescriptive principles; rather, it is a matter of the application – or non-application – of these principles to particular actions.

Consequently, the discourse on morality transitions to a virtue-ethics-based system of morality. In her essay "Modern Moral Philosophy", G.E.M. Anscombe puts forward the argument that the concepts of moral obligation, duty and the moral "ought" are rooted in the primacy of divine law (Anscombe, 1958).

The notion of morality, intertwined with ethics (Keane, 2016; Kitcher, 2014), is a far more intricate concept than a mere aggregation of norms. In any event, any discourse about moral underscores the dynamic nature of the human act, suggesting that for an act to be considered moral, it must be willed.

To reiterate the preceding example, the nurturing of children can be regarded as a moral imperative, while this moral obligation is concomitant with the effective action of infant feeding. It is imperative to consider this, as it is at this fundamental level that the crux of morality is to be found: solely those actions which are voluntarily undertaken can be considered to be truly moral. The concept of "willing" embraces the understanding of the significance of an action, as well as the identification of the necessary means to achieve a desired outcome. Morality is a process made up of several phases. To summarize:

* Rules and principles underpin an obligation.

* The primary actor, or moral subject, is an individual who directs her/his behaviour in accordance with a set of principles recognized as fundamental by the society in which this subject flourishes or is intended as original rules (natural law).

* The application of moral rules calls for two prerequisites: first, an understanding of the rules, and secondly, a willingness to adhere to them.

* Morality becomes ethics when the conduct is inclined to virtues.

The present paper puts forward the concept of pre-moral as a state that precedes rules, obligation and will. From a Kantian perspective, it could be argued that a transcendental pre-condition exerts a significant influence on moral action, thereby modulating the intensity of the act. It is evident that a pre-moral component is integrated into the deliberation process of the moral actor.

Complexity of evil

If the notion of evil is indeed so problematic and challenging to translate into a conceptual framework, this is predicated on the multifaceted profile of that idea. It can be posited that the concept of evil can be considered as a condition experienced at the physical level by both humans and animals.

However, it is exclusively humans, endowed with rationality and spiritual faculties such as self-reflection, compassion, and the conception of sin and transgression, who are capable of experiencing spiritual and psychic evil. Furthermore, the concept of evil is generally regarded as a form of disvalue, which is predominantly perceived as the antithesis of good.

Within the domain of ethics, the focus of evil is not on a "state" but rather on a dynamic process that influences human agency. The classical ontological discourse does not recognize any consistency to evil, which has been viewed as a lack (of being) or a fungus that spreads across a surface and contaminates it. In the realm of Western thought, the prevailing doctrines concerning the nature of evil have been shaped by two seminal figures: Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. These philosophers have been heavily influenced by the philosophical traditions of Plato (2009) and Aristotle (1995), which have been instrumental in shaping the conceptual underpinnings of Western thought on evil. From Aquinas’ perspective (Dougherty, 2016; Fisogni, 2022), only from the perspective of the intellect evil can be qualified as something, in terms of a conceptual being:

«Malum est quidem, in rebus, sed ut privatio, non autem ut aliquid reale, sed in ratione est ut aliquid intellectum, sed in ratione est ut aliquid intellectum; et ideo potest dici quod malum est in ens rationis et non rei, quia in intellectum est aliquid, non autem in re. Et hoc ipsum quod esse intellectum, secundum quod aliquid dicitur esse rationis, est bonum: bonum enim est aliquid intelligi». (D. M, Q. I, art 1, resp. 20)

«Evil is indeed in things, although as a privation and not as an entity, and in concept as something understood, and so we can say that evil is a conceptual being and not a real being, since evil is something in the intellect and not an entity. And insofar as we call some things conceptual beings, the very beings that the intellect understands are good, since it is good to understand things» (On Evil, translated by Richard Regan, 2001; Italics are mine).

In the modern era, the concept of evil in relation to human conduct was mainly investigated by Kant, especially in “Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason” (Kant, 2005). He assumes that the inclination to good, which primarily belongs to humans, can be affected by passions that incline to evildoing (Timmons, 2021; Rae, 2019). Arendt made a further step in the issue, by coining the term "banality of evil" in “Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil” (Arendt, 1965). The German thinker, exploring the dynamics of evil within the willing process (Arendt, 1978) certainly follows Aquinas in recognizing that evil is not ‘radical’ in in Kantian sense (it does not lie within the human nature), nor in the terms that she held in “The Origins of Totalitarianism” (Arendt, 1973): it can be absolute (Lat.: ab solutus) disconnected from motives but it spreads over human condition (Fisogni, 2022). In contrast to the extensive literature on the concept of evil that this paper only sketches, the philosophical discourse on the pre-moral aspect has received comparatively less attention, despite its historical significance.

Pre-moral aspects of evil in today's world

 Interest in the pre-moral aspects of evildoing motivates a theoretical approach to the phenomenon, which has emerged in the contemporary global world. The last few decades have been characterized by the rise of conflicts, terrorism and new forms of evildoing, especially in the digital domain. If we had to choose a starting point, it would probably be September 11 2001, not only because of the impact that this major terrorist event perpetrated in the US had on collective consciousness, but also because the new millennium accelerated transformations. Furthermore, if we had to choose two dates to mark the emergence of pre-moral aspects of evil, they would be the moment when the real and digital worlds, the online and the offline domains, became interconnected, giving rise to the Onlife world (Floridi, 2015), and the onset of the pandemic era.

These two features, the Onlife environment and the 2020 Coronavirus outbreak, acted as a sounding board, amplifying the relevance of the two main aspects of pre-moral evil: the drying up of a person's intimate ground and the acceleration of digital processes that can amplify / accelerate and made evildoing spreading. The existence of a globalized world has definitely played a key role in spreading the phenomenon of pre-moral evil worldwide and in its viral contamination of all aspects of everyday life (Johnson, 2014), whose potential is still unknown.

The next paragraphs will provide a concise overview of intimate dryness and the role of digital technology as a moral facilitator for radicalization and suicide. It should be noted at this point that, from an ontological point of view, these pre-moral traits are neutral per se, but they can have a highly negative impact on human conduct and relationships. Precisely, the lack of sensing affects the inclination of the person to the good and the cyber processes affects the dynamics of the human act.

In general, pre-moral facets of evil can be identified within the broader anthropological experience of evil (not exclusively limited to moral transgressions as evildoing), manifesting as a state of intimate disease. The phenomenon of "pandemic fatigue", the spiritual crisis experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic (Badre, 2012), and the experience of a sense of void related to disconnection, as well as the impulse to suicide in young people, are revealing phenomena of such discomfort.

Intimate dryness of the person: the case of global terrorism

There is no doubt that global terrorism, which has been a feature of the global landscape since the turn of the millennium, is one of the most pertinent contemporary examples of wrongdoing. From the events of 11 September 2001 to the rise and fall of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (2014–2017), and the spread of cyberterrorism and right-wing terrorism, it has demonstrated an impressive ability to transform itself rapidly all over the world, so that it can be equated to a virus (Fisogni, 2019 a; 2019 b; 2021).

There is a broad consensus among scholars that terrorists do not suffer from mental illness, as their destructive world-view engenders a sense of transcendence (Fisogni, 2010). These individuals, despite their harsh hate towards human beings who are not part of the subversive group, have been observed to retain their autonomy of will and have not been subjected to brainwashing. However, they have been observed to undergo a profound process of ideologization and radicalization. From a philosophical perspective, the typical closure of terrorists within small groups that have cut any relationship with the world around them has had relevant consequences on their inner selves.

The dissociation from society engenders a substantial loss of reality, which constitutes a primary component of a weakened identity (Fisogni, 2009; 2010). The phenomenon of dehumanization can be comprehended only through an emphasis on the concept of sensing, which is a fundamental term in the phenomenology of the human person. Sensing is not merely passive; rather, it constitutes an active component in the dialectic of willing. This notion was meticulously theorized by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century and subsequently reinvigorated in contemporary philosophy by German phenomenological thinkers, most notably Husserl and Stein.

In Doctor Angelicus's doctrine, specifically “Quaestio 15” of the “Summa Theologiae” Ia-IIae Pars of the Aquinas (Aquinas, 1985), the role of sensing is identified as a fundamental component of the will. The act of sensing cannot be compared to mere perception or sensitive feeling; it primarily allows for the formation of an idea of the object itself or the person herself, and secondarily, it is a crucial component of any action. The act of sensing, according to “Quaestio 15”, is the catalyst for ethical conduct through the following passages: 1) it engenders direct involvement with the res, or the object of experience; 2) it provides a taste of the res; 3) both intellectual knowledge and appetitive tension are fundamental to moral judgement.

It can thus be concluded that sensing is an experience of the good that is more sensitive than intellectual. It allows the human being to become acquainted with a pre-moral good that is given (positum), which orients the will to something that is tasted as valuable.

The significance of sensing in decision-making processes is a subject that merits closer examination. As the sensitivity to external stimuli diminishes, the propensity of the individual to align with positive influences also declines. Consequently, the ability to act with autonomy is diminished, and they begin to operate without restraint. The phenomenon of dehumanization in the context of terrorist activities encompasses both the individual's sense of self and the actions they undertake.

The following three characteristics are indicative of the loss of being that is reflected in the self: all of them contribute to the weakening of human action. The ensuing discourse will concentrate on a concise depiction of malevolent characters, focusing on four salient issues.

* The concept of uniform identity prevails over that of individual identity. Within the group of perpetrators, there is an absence of space for the establishment of authentic interpersonal relationships. It is at this point that the subject experiences a state of moral disorientation.

* Secondly, the issue of indifference towards the world of life and reality in general is of concern. In the context of terrorist activities, the only real world in which such individuals operate is that of a subversive group. Within this milieu, the uniform identity of the group members becomes increasingly pronounced, thereby engendering a progressive and unlimited form of hate. This level is distinguished by an ontological loss, which is characterized by a weakening of the experience of good.

* Thirdly, the prevailing circumstances appear to defy rational comprehension; it is the subversive group and the extreme ideology that underpin it that appear to offer a modicum of logical coherence. The world of terrorism is regarded as a source of sense and value; however, it is not yet the world of life, but rather the subversive action in itself.

* To progress from the third issue to the fourth, it is necessary to consider the relationship between self and will. The concept of identity is inextricably linked to that of the will, given its role in orienting human actions towards tangible entities. It has been posited that terrorists are afflicted by a compromised sense of identity, predicated on the fundamental human tendency towards benevolence.

The cyber world as a moral enabler

The existing body of knowledge about the digital realm is inadequate in light of the rapid evolution of its multifaceted dimensions, including the Onlife dimension of our lives, the cognitive domain of artificial intelligence, and the agentic component of AI, among others. However, it can be argued that this mixed environment is a neglected area of philosophical and anthropological research, deserving further investigation and greater recognition. The focus of this discussion is the impact of pre-moral aspects of evil on human agency. In this chapter, an overview of the salient issues in this field will be provided, synthesized into a key concept.

The digital age has seen a proliferation of data, with the concomitant acceleration of processing speeds. However, this has also had consequences for decision-making dynamics, as will be demonstrated in the following paragraph. It is at this juncture that the rationale behind the digital element of this phenomenon's moral implications becomes apparent. Primarily, it functions as a catalyst for moral behaviour, and, significantly, as a preliminary stage in the moral aspect of evildoing in certain contexts.

Three phenomena, which have been studied for years by the author, will be taken into consideration: intimate dryness of the person’s spiritual ground; the cyber radicalization of terrorists; the role of the Internet as an accelerator for suicide in young people.

The Islamic State (2014-2017) and the radicalization through the Internet

The Internet played an instrumental role in the formation of the Islamic State (2014-2017), especially for the radicalization of a huge number of individuals – women and men from worldwide, of any age, education, and social condition – who became involved with the Caliphate (Lahoud et al., 2014). The Islamic State was born on the basis of affiliation to Al Qaeda's satellite system. The founder, Al Zarqawi, conceived the group as a state entity that could be built through the union of territories or by waging war on the basis of agreements or military operations. By the declaration of the Caliphate by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2014, the organization has functioned as a state within the global arena, guided by the Salafi-Wahabi ideology. The primary objective of this state has been to establish a global Islamic community (umma) grounded in the tenets of takfīr ideology and the principle of religious warfare. Unlike the first wave of global terrorism of the 21st century, in which al-Qaeda played a leading role, the Caliphate has had a special relationship with the internet and digital power since its very beginning. Notably, the process of radicalization via the internet and the spread of its global presence were both highly significant.

The online environment has been identified as a facilitator for self-radicalized individuals to execute attacks. It is important to note that this phenomenon cannot be merely reduced to a space for radicalization or an "echo chamber" (von Behr et al., 2013: xiii). The Internet provides a wealth of resources and facilitates connections between individuals and communities of like-minded individuals (Bartolucci & Gallo, 2013: 4). The Onlife environment plays a pivotal role in the transition from the 'possible' to the 'effective' attack, acting as a moral enabler. In its capacity as a dual interactive medium, it is impartial per se: it has the capacity to either facilitate or impede the occurrence of an event. In the case of lone terrorist actors, the conditions are conducive to the formation of decisions and the incitement of responses, behaviours and actions.

It’s a fact that the digital environment has played a significant role in the rise of self-made terrorism, where individuals carried out real-world attacks after having been radicalized online. This shift from virtual intent to concrete action is a major concern in understanding cyberterrorism in the Onlife age, where online and offline behaviors constantly influence each other. Understanding how an online radicalized individual becomes an active terrorist requires examining the invisible processes that connect a "possible" plan to an "effective" performance. This connection, often unseen, can be understood through a systemic viewpoint (Agazzi, 2019; Minati, 2019). Systems, including Onlife terrorism, are constantly changing through processes of acquisition and dissipation. Some qualities are lost, and new ones are gained, ultimately leading to a structural dynamic that achieves stability. This stability itself is "opaque" or structurally hidden, meaning its causes aren't immediately obvious.

Opacity in Systemic Thinking refers to the complex region of interactions that aren't directly observable. However, it allows for cognitive inferences—mental deductions—that help us understand phenomena we can't directly see. Think of light hitting a metal surface: the visible input (light) and output (metal's response) are connected by invisible, microscopic interactions. Despite being unseen, this "ground" provides insights and allows for verifiable hypotheses about the transformation from input to output.

This cognitive dynamical frame is crucial for understanding how terroristic intentions (Anscombe, 1957) become real actions, especially in the case of lone actors. Focusing on the hidden but theoretically grounded link between the "possible" (internet propaganda) and the "effective" (the attack) helps solve a key problem: the internet and social media aren't weapons themselves, but they can foster radicalization.

The Internet and suicide

 Suicide represents a leading cause of death among adolescents worldwide. A plethora of reasons underpin such a radical decision, frequently associated with a state of heightened psychological vulnerability. There is an increasing emphasis in both the mass media and the scientific community on the role played by the Internet and social networks as an "echo chamber" for the decision to commit suicide (Fisogni & Fisogni, 2021 b).

This phenomenon is considered to have a profound impact on young people. The acceleration of the final movement, which translates ideal content (suggestions from net suicides, social media or bullying) into performance, is attributable to the interaction between virtual and real. These considerations offer a renewed perspective on the concept of incitement and underscore the role of disorientation as a critical component of suicide, validating, on a systemic level (interaction between offline and online environments, in the Onlife macrosystem), observations made on a phenomenological level. The Internet intervenes on the cognitive/deliberative processes that are normally opaque to knowledge, as they are the prerogative of the individual. The formation of intention through the dynamics of analogy and interrelation, and its reflection on consensus, is taken as a starting point for a more problematic understanding of a phenomenon that is so relevant to the contemporary youth condition.

Studies on the Internet and young people, although numerous, tend to focus on the consequences of increasingly prolonged digital exposure (Onu, 2024), due to the role of the Internet as a space for socialisation. Therefore, the analysis of phenomena such as pathological Internet use (PIU) and maladaptive Internet use (MIU) helps us to understand the origin of certain “unhealthy” forms of connection to the web, which are not included in the DSM V diagnostic manual and can be linked to the vast domain of social media. MIU – Maladaptive Internet Use) help us understand the origin of certain “unhealthy” forms of connection to the web, not included in the DSM V diagnostic manual and related to the vast domain of psychological addictions, we know little about the dynamics resulting from the continuous transition from “real” to “virtual”, so peculiar to our Onlife condition (The Center for Internet & Technology Addiction, 2025).

Any decision is inherently individual. The digital network, regarded as a macro container, fulfils two functions. Firstly, it serves as a facilitator for the intentional process, thereby rendering the steps and connections/processes leading to the act accessible. Secondly, it undeniably accelerates the subject's focus on the final stage of the action, that is, the execution. This acceleration in the transition from intention to execution becomes the kernel passage to the performance of the suicide act.

The individual experiencing suicidal ideation undergoes a transition from a state of circular intention to a linear decision-making process. There is also a transition from communicative interaction to a withdrawal into oneself, accompanied by an experience of motivational pressure that significantly exceeds one's capacity to process it. From this standpoint, the transition from online to offline environments appears to be a pivotal factor in the phenomenon of suicide, particularly among adolescents, who constitute the predominant demographic of social network users. Contrary to the notion of the Werther effect, which posits that individuals' problem-solving behaviours are influenced by external factors, this transition suggests that a collective intention has superseded individual decision-making processes. The concept of collective intention, as pioneered by the authors of the present article, underscores the role of the network in shaping intention. This concept involves the convergence of the self-determination of diverse subjects (friends, peers, strangers) comprising the web community to influence the decision of the individual/target. To a certain extent, the process leading to the act, emphasised and charged by web interaction, exerts a significant influence on self-determination in the economy of action.

This is not merely due to a generic "suggestion" or "instigation", but rather because it significantly restricts the subject's ownership of the intention, thereby facilitating a more rapid consensus and a somewhat depersonalised act. This anthropological issue, which is of considerable complexity, evidently necessitates several interdisciplinary examinations.

Conclusion

It is not possible to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the pre-conditions of evildoing in the limited space of a paper, given that these conditions are numerous and multifaceted in essence. The objective of this philosophical investigation was twofold. Firstly, it sought to introduce a previously neglected issue concerning moral conduct. Secondly, it focused on the role of the Internet in the digital environment. In summary, the argument was made that the issue has been brought to the fore by two factors: firstly, globalization, and secondly, the interconnected world that has been part of our lives since the beginning of the millennium. The global phenomenon of terrorism was considered, with particular attention being paid to the consequences of radicalization and the rejection of respectful interaction. The dehumanization that results from this lack of empathy has been shown to reduce an individual's capacity to recognise and pursue the good, which is a significant component of human will. The phenomenon of online radicalisation, which has been particularly prevalent during the Caliphate (2014-2017), underscores the transformative influence of the digital realm in accelerating decision-making processes.

These pre-moral aspects, which play a role in wrongdoing, are not limited to global terrorism; they affect the social environment, as well as human activity. For this reason, a more comprehensive interdisciplinary approach is required.

Although only outlined here in terms of their main characteristics, the pre-moral aspects of evil have demonstrated their potential influence on human behaviour. For this reason, it is imperative for philosophy, as well as anthropological studies in general, to develop a clear understanding of how these cognitive, deliberative and spiritual processes function. The traditional tools of philosophy appear outdated and inadequate. For the author, the most promising approach to this salient issue is Systemic Thinking (Von Bertalanffy, 1967). There are at least two reasons to support this argument. Firstly, we are facing fast interactions between multiple systems (the human person, the internet, the onlife world, the environment and the global scenario) that can only be understood in terms of 'processes', not mere 'concepts' or 'conditions'. Secondly, their virality is an undeniable fact. They propagate within multiple environments. In the present day, only Systemic Thinking calls for an interdisciplinary approach to anthropological matters, shedding light on the thorniest issues.

The final consideration concerns the impact of pre-moral aspects of evil on human behaviour. The question that arises can be expressed as follows: Why are they so dangerous?

In summary, they could be said to attack the dynamics of human action by limiting the inclination towards good.

1) The spiritual ground's intimate dryness, mainly caused by radicalization or any other form of deliberate closure to life, provokes a dissipation of the will.

2) Secondly, the acceleration of cognitive capabilities in machines, coupled with the shift from the real to the digital, diminishes the strength of intention (the capacity to recognise the steps leading to an act) and consent (the final decision by which free will commits itself to action).

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