The Appeals for Peace: Why Are They So Ineffective?

Pope Leo XIV, following the path of his predecessors, continues to issue urgent appeals for peace. Why, despite his significant moral authority, do these appeals so often go unheeded? Tonight, Rekh Magazine presents the second chapter of our ongoing exploration into "Encounter and Dialogue," authored by Primavera Fisogni, PhD. The dynamics of an appeal will be examined in dialogue with the concept of Intention coined by GEM Anscombe

Pope Leo XIV (Wikipedia)

By Primavera Fisogni

Premise

The notion of intention, as developed by G.E.M. Anscombe in her ramarkable philosophical essay Intention (1957), exhibits no explicit link to the idea of relation. Within the three essential expressions of the term, intention remains—whether transcendently or immanently—the sole property of an agent’s action. There are, however, actions (such as appeals: for dialogue, for the end of global violence, for the conservation of planetary energy, for the revaluation of the family, etc.) that can be viewed as "intentional" yet whose performance requires them to become the intention of other actors. This class of actions, featured by an intentional intertwining—increasingly prominent in current affairs (consider the political role some of these appeals play in a global perspective)—correlates to a notion of good and evil linked to the participation in or the failure to adopt the appeal (e.g., one can kill someone by failing to provide aid). In this type of action, intention evokes—within the framework of traditional moral discourse—expressions such as co-responsibility and allows for a deeper moral exploration of the illocutionary force of certain utterances. From Anscombe’s theoretical perspective, such acts are problematic and prompt a consideration of the notion of "relation."

1. The appeal: An intentional action

The question of whether the appeal constitutes an intentional action is therefore fundamental to this analysis. From a pragmatic perspective, the efficacy of a performative speech act is intrinsically linked to its fulfilability. When measured against the three applications of the term intention as delineated by Anscombe, the utterance "(I say to you) save as much of the earth's water as possible!" manifests the intention of doing (in formulating the appeal, the speaker sets themselves the task of defending the Earth), the aim of doing (sensitising others to a problem the speaker considers crucial for the survival of living beings), and that which is intended to be done (calling someone's attention). As Anscombe asserts, the "Why?" question serves as the fundamental litmus test for identifying an intentional action. In this particular instance, the appeal substantiates its designation as an intentional act. The appeal must articulate its rationale, as it is an utterance designed to be comprehended and endorsed. The motivation of an individual is typically characterised by two distinct elements: the initial impulse that precipitates the action, and the subsequent outcome that is desired as a result of that action. For example: The present water emergency, which has been exacerbated by climate change, necessitates an appeal to others to conserve the Earth's water resources. Furthermore, an appeal is inherently directed towards a specific objective, whether it be the well-being of the planet, the initiation of dialogue, or the release of political prisoners. However, if we measure the appeal against another parameter of verification for intentional action cited by Anscombe – the act of doing what happens – we encounter difficulties. This is due to the presence of a distinction between my own actions and the occurrence of the event itself. The former statement may be interpreted as an attempt to provide a description of the events that transpired; however, it does not necessarily equate to an accurate representation of the actions that the speaker asserts they were undertaking. To illustrate this point, consider the following example: The description of the act of inviting someone to engage in dialogue does not correspond with the reality of the interlocutor accepting the invitation. The author of this appeal is unaware of whether the appeal has been taken into consideration.

To put it another way, does the act of appealing imply that the interlocutor has received one's words as a plea? It is possible that an individual may not have been aware of the occurrence, another may not have accepted it, and yet another may have accepted it but not expressed it visibly. Consequently, it is not possible to ascertain whether the description of the events (I hereby extend an invitation for dialogue) precisely aligns with the actions I would attribute to myself.

2. My intention is the intention of others

The appeal's peculiarity lies in its definition as a fully intentional action, which necessitates that its content (for example, the act of initiating a dialogue in the appeal for dialogue) becomes the intentional action of others. In other words, for there to be a congruence between my actions (what I am doing) and the occurrence (what is actually taking place), another person must formulate at least a prediction (I will do this: I will commit to not consuming excessive water), that is, express an intention for a future action. It is evident, therefore, that an intentional act (i.e. the appeal) is initiated by one individual, which is subsequently completed by another through their own intentional action. This intertwining of intentions is revealed as a characteristic of the utterances in question. This structural element provides the foundation for the organisation, yet it is also susceptible to specific vulnerabilities. It is important to note that appeals are typically underestimated in political spheres in comparison to other types of actions, such as embargoes and military initiatives. This tendency can be evidenced by the international community's apparent indifference to the repeated and persistent calls by Pope Leo XIV for the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, the Middle East, and Lebanon. However, when viewed from an intentional perspective, the appeal acquires a powerful practical significance: that of a call to the sharing of a responsibility or, in the perspective described by Anscombe, to the sharing of an intention, such that my intention is also your intention. In this sense, the appeal is radically distinguished from other similar utterances, such as the command. The utterance "stop the war" can be interpreted in two distinct ways. Firstly, it can be understood as an imperative, denoting an order to cease hostilities. Secondly, it can be regarded as an expression of an appeal, entailing a request to discontinue the war. In a command, the individual who is instructed to take action may or may not concur with the cessation of hostilities; nevertheless, compliance is obligatory. In an appeal, the obligation is not the primary consideration; rather, it is the intention to act in a particular manner.

2.1 Failure of Intentional Actions and Failure of the Appeal

According to Anscombe, intention may fail to be realized, and this depends on two main conditions: either an error of description has occurred, or the error is in the event (see the famous grocery list chapter). I realize the appeal if I want to make the speaker's intention my own.

2.2 Willing the Intention of the Other

Willing the intention of the other constitutes the problematic core of the appeal. An act of this type does not derive its force from the voice or the media impact of the one who expresses it. What matters, strange as it may seem, is the interlocutor to whom it is directed. It is "I" who decides upon "your" appeal, because it is up to me to understand who you are who appeals, and what meaning your action holds. Co-responsibility is not situated at the level of sharing an action that has been appealed for, but at an even more preliminary level: the understanding of the meaning of the proposed action and the judgment on the value (good or bad) of that action. The position of the interlocutor is decisive, never neutral. This explains the gravity, on a moral level, that occurs when one does not respond to an appeal for help: what is grave is the failure to decide in one direction or the other.

At this point, we ask ourselves:

• Can one will the intention of the other? (e.g., if I dialogue, I accept X's appeal for dialogue).

• Or can one will one's own intention? (e.g., if I dialogue, I do so because I express a complex practical judgment that leads me to take this initiative, even though X has appealed to that effect, eliciting my adherence).

• Can co-responsibility be reduced to a problem of understanding, i.e., to the more or less complete, more or less clear reception of the message?

The three questions help to shed further light on the intentional dynamic underlying utterances such as appeals and, more generally, on the intentions of actions. At stake, beyond the explicit intention—and more than the explicit intention—there is indeed an implicit intention. If the Pope exhorts dialogue, it is not dialogue as such that he aims for, but rather the solution of conflicts far more costly—on a social and economic level—than a discussion, however demanding.

In other words, the Pope "gives to understand" (gives to be intended) a content of meaning that goes beyond what is properly said (beyond the description of the intention). Implementing dialogue, therefore, requires that this implied aspect be grasped. If this is the case, it is not at all absurd to think of co-responsibility in terms of "understanding": the interlocutor's response (at the heart of the idea of responsibility is precisely responding), or rather their taking of a position as a prelude to an act, follows the acceptance of that implied message.

From the perspective of pragmatics, an author like Récanati would say that we are in the presence of an "intention to communicate something in addition to what is literally signified. The illocutionary force of appeals, if read in the Anscombian perspective of intention, acquires a moral charge that appears only implicitly in the context of pragmatics, despite these being intentional (linguistic) acts. This very aspect allows us to answer the first two questions raised earlier.

Can one will the intention of the other? In reality, the enactment of the appeal is never the assumption of another's intention, but the result of sharing that implicit content, which becomes the motive for both the appellant and the interlocutor. What is willed, therefore, is the motivation that orients the other's intention and which, participated/shared, becomes the engine of the intentional action that will be put into practice. Otherwise, there would be no distinction between the appeal and the command.

Does one only will one's own intention? In Anscombe's perspective, intention belongs entirely to the agent. But then, what sense would the appeal have? The raison d'être of this speech act is precisely to pass an intention along, to make it transitive or, if we prefer, to establish a relation or an intertwining of intentions. If, however, we return to the implicit component of "giving to understand," we realize that the intention is willed (by the agent) when it is grasped/received. Should this openness be lacking—which is simultaneously co-responsible sharing—the interlocutor's intentional action would also fail.

Can co-responsibility be reduced to a problem of understanding? To return to the example of dialogue, the practice of confrontation between subjects in conflict brings effective results only if everyone has understood and contextually made their own the need to follow that path. If even one of the partners sits at the dialogue table only for convenience or thinking they can play their own game, the result—likely—will not be the one hoped for, as evidenced by the difficulty of the dialogic process.

3. Action, intention, relation

What is the relationship between intention and relation? Anscombe does not deal with it explicitly in Intention; however, the meanings of intention and intentional action, around which her treatise revolves, seem to concern an auto-centered agent, caught in the act of acting for rather than in that of acting with other subjects. Nevertheless, in the triple sense indicated by the English philosopher, intention presents—albeit implicitly and minimally—a relational character, insofar as it "tends toward," and is thus an expression of a performative and simultaneously ideal impulse.

In the description of the appeal, one notices an effective and reciprocal dialectic between the intentions of multiple subjects, not explicitly considered by Anscombe in Intention, but characteristic of a certain number of human actions, with the following peculiarities:

• The speaker expresses an intention that is fulfilled if an interlocutor makes it their own.

• The speaker must have interlocutors: if I appeal, and no one hears me, there is not even an appeal.

• The pragmatic fragility (efficacy, translation into act) of the appeal is relational, because it always depends on two subjects in relationship (I who speak, you who listen to me).

• Co-responsibility is a bond that, on a practical level, is established at the level of having the intention or not having the intention to act in a certain way, before actually acting.

• The failure of the intentional action of the appeal depends primarily on the non-assumption of an implicit and implied intention (giving to understand).

References

Alici, L. (Ed.). (2002). Azione e persona: le radici della prassi. Vita e Pensiero.

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957). Intention. Blackwell.

Austin, J. L. (1971). Philosophical papers. Oxford University Press.

Austin, J. L. (1975). How to do things with words. Clarendon Press.

Bianchi, C. (2003). Pragmatica del linguaggio. Laterza.

Fisogni, P. (2006). Incontro al dialogo. La sfida dell’intesa nei tempi della crisi. Franco Angeli.

Ingarden, R. (1982). Sulla responsabilità. Cseo.

Récanati, F. (1981). Les énoncés performatifs: Contribution à la pragmatique. Les Éditions de Minuit.

Rist, J. M. (2002). Desiderio e azione. In L. Alici (Ed.), Azione e persona: le radici della prassi (p. 37). Vita e Pensiero.